JOHN YANG: While President Trump talks about# trying to make a deal with Iran to end the war,## more U.S.

troops are headed to the region.# The 82nd Airborne Division's 1st Combat## Brigade Team has been ordered to deploy, and# the Marine amphibious warship the USS Tripoli## is expected to arrive in the Middle East in# the coming days, along with other assets.

So what new capabilities do these forces# bring, and how might they be used?

For that, we turn to two people with# extensive military experience.

Retired## Army Colonel Joel Rayburn served in the first# Trump administration on the national security## staff with a focus on Iran in the Middle# East.

He's now at the Hudson Institute.## And retired Lieutenant Colonel Frederic# Wehrey focused on the Middle East during## his two decades in the Air Force.

He's now at# the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Jack Rayburn, let me start with you.

What new## capabilities will the United States# forces have with these new troops?

COL.

JOEL RAYBURN (RET.

), Former Trump National# Security Council Staff: Good to be with you.

Well, the troops of the 82nd Airborne# Division tha.. that's part of the Rapid Deployment Force# that can deploy anywhere in the world with## very short notice.

The 82nd Airborne# Division, the brigades and battalions## of that division are uniquely trained for# forcible entry into contested territory.

So they're the kind of troops that# do rapid insertion into, for example,## strategic infrastructure like an airfield.

If# you think about the war in Grenada back in the## Reagan administration, it was the 82nd Airborne# Division that seized the airfield on Grenada.

And they usually do that in order to pave# the way for, open the way for follow-on,## more robust, heavier forces to come in# after them.

So that's an insertion force.## The Marine forces that are coming,# there are two Marine expeditionary units## that are on their way as part# of amphibious ready groups.

Those are the kind of forces that are trained and# equipped to do amphibious assaults onto islands,## onto ports or to seize vessels.# So, two very similar forces,## move rapidly, be able to be able to# seize key infrastructure quickly.

JOHN YANG: Fred, anything you# don't want to add to that?

LT.

COL.

FREDERIC WEHREY (RET.

), U.S.

Air# Force: I agree.

These are remarkable forces.## They strike deep.

They strike hard.

They're# quick Response Forces.

As was mentioned,## they're designed to seize assets very# quickly so that other forces can flow## into a region as part of a larger assault force.

They're not designed for longer-duration# operations.

And they're also, I should add,## self-contained, especially the Marine# units.

They have their own air support,## their own armor, their own helicopters.

And that## makes them able to really go anywhere# in the world and operate autonomously.

JOHN YANG: Jack, how would you# expect these troops to be used?

COL.

JOEL RAYBURN (RET.

): Yes, I think# clearly what's happening here is that## the president and Central Command are moving# these assets into the theater to signal that## they have the option, they have the capability of# seizing islands such as Kharg Island or seizing## potentially the islands that the Iranian regime# uses in order to threaten the Strait of Hormuz.

There are several islands closer to the Strait# of Hormuz from which they traditionally have## done that, or also to provide supporting kind# of seizure operations if there's a military## forcing of the strait.

So it really increases# the president and Central Command's options.

JOHN YANG: Kharg Island, of course,## is where 90 -- about 90 percent of# Iran's oil is .. COL.

JOEL RAYBURN (RET.

): Right.

JOHN YANG: Fred, are these things a# good idea?

Is it a good .. LT.

COL.

FREDERIC WEHREY (RET.

): They're,# quite frankly, fraught with risk.

I mean, very -- obviously, these forces could## accomplish their tactical objectives.# They could seize the island.

They could## destroy coastal missile batteries.

They could# seize various sites along the Strait of Hormuz.

But then the question is, what# next?

And, really, the question is,## does that tactical advantage become# a strategic liability?

Because those## forces are now exposed.

We know that Iran# has trained for this sort of scenario.## There's a saying among military planners# that the enemy always gets a vote, right?

And so the Iranians may have multiple# retaliation options against these forces,## against staging areas, against the supply lines.# The other big risk is that it will not completely## free the Strait of Hormuz, right?

It# will certainly degrade Iran's ability## to disrupt the traffic coming in, but# it won't solve the problem completely.

And then I should also add,# we have seen this before,## where there's an initial# force, and because it doesn't## achieve its strategic objectives, it# may achieve its tactical objectives,## those strategic objectives remain unobtained# or unfulfilled, that requires more forces.

You have to set up a buffer zone to# protect those forces.

And very quickly,## you're in a situation of mission creep.

JOHN YANG: Jack, what do you think of --# make of the fact that these forces were## not in the region when this war# began?

What does that tell you?

COL.

JOEL RAYBURN (RET.

): I think it# means these were an option.

I mean,## look, military planners plan everything to the# nth degree.

I used to be one.

I think Fred did## too.

You planned scenarios in branches# and sequels to all of your base plans.

I just think it just means this was an option# that they maybe hoped not to have to employ,## but also they adapted to the situation.# I think, look, as far as whether it's a## good idea, it's a high-risk tactical# operation, but the payoff is huge.

If there's a U.S.

seizure of Kharg Island,# if there's a U.S.

forcing of the strait,## militarily forcing of the strait, sort of game# over for Tehran at that point.

They're pretty## much -- they're out of strategic military# options.

They have been quite degraded.

We are the enemy that has gotten a# vote in their game plan.

They are## off their game plan.

I don't think their# command-and-control is coherent enough## to be able to adapt.

I think our forces# are inside their OODA loop, if you will.

So, as I say, tactical risk of# that kind of operation is high.## The payoff strategically would also be quite high.

JOHN YANG: And, Joel, I# apologize for calling you Jack.

Fred, are these troops, do you think that# they are leveraged for negotiations?

Or## are the -- is the United States looking# to change the trajectory of this war?

LT.

COL.

FREDERIC WEHREY (RET.

):# I think both could be at play.

And I agree with Joel that the military has# obviously thought through multiple scenarios,## but I'm just very concerned that the Iranians have## thought this through before.

And we# don't know their strategic calculus.

You seize a critical oil terminal like# Kharg, you could empower hard-liners.## You could really force the regime to dig# in even deeper.

I don't think it's game## over for them.

I think they have got# redundancy.

They have got resilience.## They could open conflict in another# theater.

They could engage proxies.

So we don't know their retaliation options.# I think they see this as a long game,## right?

I mean, you're talking about a# generation of leadership that weathered## the Iran-Iraq War.

This is very short term# for them, right?

And so simply seizing these## islands and these assets, I don't know# if it's -- I don't think it's going to## change their strategic calculus about# suddenly giving in to Trump's terms.

JOHN YANG: Fred, I want to stay with you for# a second.

There's been a lot of talk about## the rhetoric of the secretary of defense,# Pete Hegseth.

He talked about no quarter,## no mercy for our enemies.

He said there# would be no stupid rules of engagement.

Early this week, he prayed that every# round find its mark against the enemies## of righteousness.

What do you make of this?

LT.

COL.

FREDERIC WEHREY (RET.

): Well, it's,# quite frankly, shocking.

It's irresponsible,## strategically reckless, ethically# problematic on multiple fronts.

I mean, look, the Constitution specifies# a separation between religion and state,## between church and state.

And so# public officials are not supposed## to use their office to push a particular# religious vision.

And that's exactly## what the secretary is doing with this very# apocalyptic Christian nationalist vision.

The second issue is, the U.S.

armed forces# are very diverse.

You have men and women## of diverse faiths or no faiths at all.# And that's going to create frustration## or alienation.

It's not a good leadership# strategy.

You're not building inclusion.

I mean, the other problem with framing this... JOHN YANG: Fred, I'm going to interrupt# you, because w.. and I'd like to hear Joel's thoughts on this.

LT.

COL.

FREDERIC WEHREY (RET.

): Yes.

JOHN YANG: Sorry.

LT.

COL.

FREDERIC WEHREY (RE.. COL.

JOEL RAYBURN (RET.

): Yes, and I think# Secretary Hegseth is the secretary at.. He's trying to explain to his forces who are# engaged while they're fighting.

And he's trying## to inspire them.

He's trying to -- he's trying# to get -- show them confidence in the campaign.

And I think he's also -- he's also a little bit# frustrated about the depiction of a campaign## which is a one-sided contest being --# as being something other than that.

JOHN YANG: Joel Rayburn and Fred# Wehrey, thank you both very much.